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Several studies use the investment - cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financing 
constraints while some others disagree. The source of this disparity lies mostly in 
differences in opinion regarding the segregation of severely financially constrained 
firms from less constrained ones. We examine this controversy by analyzing firms 
affiliated to business groups that are subject to less financing constraints relative to 
independent firms. Our results show strong investment – cash flow sensitivities for 
both group and non-group firms, but no significant difference between them. The 
finding is robust to alternative investment models and estimation techniques. We 
investigate this finding further by analyzing the influence of various firm-specific 
characteristics like size, age, leverage and ownership structure. We continue to 
observe that less financially constrained firms do not exhibit a significantly lower 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow. The results of the study thus provide new and 
compelling evidence demonstrating the inability of investment – cash flow sensitivity 









Understanding the determinants of a firm’s investment behavior is an 
important topic of corporate finance. This is reflected in a number of studies that 
investigate the relationship of corporate investment to cash flow of individual firms.1 
A widely held belief is that the cash flow available to a firm is the principal 
determinant of its real investments. The amount of internal funds and the problems 
associated with obtaining additional external funds primarily affect these investments. 
The traditional view put forward by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) suggests 
that investments undertaken by firms facing severe financing constraints are more 
sensitive to its cash flows. Several papers subsequently support their argument. 
However, studies like Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) find evidence to 
the contrary: firms that are least financially constrained exhibit greater investment – 
cash flow sensitivity. 
 
The source of this contradictory finding lies in the disagreement in identifying 
appropriate factors to segregate more financially constrained firms from less 
constrained ones (Moyen, 2004). The factors largely used in prior studies (e.g. 
dividend payout, debt financing, financial distress, firm size) are endogenous in the 
sense that these are not independently determined. Moreover, these factors are time-
variant. A company identified as financially constrained in one year may not remain 
constrained in the following year. 
 
These problems do not arise if one uses exogenous firm-characteristics. One 





business group or not. Usually, firms are not free to choose joining a particular 
business group. In addition, a firm’s group-affiliation does not change over time. 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) reports that membership in the six largest 
Japanese groups has been stable for over three decades. Group-affiliated firms are 
widely believed to have more access to funds relative to independent firms because of 
their ability to use internal capital market benefits and to tap more external financial 
resources. If a firm’s financial constraint status really affects its investment – cash 
flow sensitivity as advocated by the traditional literature, then business group firms 
should exhibit significantly lower sensitivity than that of stand-alone firms. The 
purpose of our study is to examine this issue by using detailed data on a large sample 
of Indian group-affiliated firms and independent firms. 
 
Although this is not the first study on business groups, our analysis fills an 
important gap in the literature. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Shin and 
Park (1999) earlier examine Japanese and Korean business groups. Interestingly, these 
two studies find dissimilar results: Japanese business group firms exhibit a lower 
investment - cash flow sensitivity while there is no relationship between cash flow 
and investment among group-affiliated firms in Korea. This contradictory finding 
could be attributed to unique characteristics of business groups of these two countries 
and/or lack of robustness checks with alternative empirical specifications. 
 
Our study provides evidence on Indian business groups which possess several 
features that yield a more reliable empirical analysis. For example, it is possible to 
identify business group affiliation in India with a high level of accuracy. This 





authorities.2 Furthermore, we consider firms that are a member of only one business 
group and that did not change their group affiliation over time. Indian business groups 
are also not centered on a financial intermediary and do not have close banking ties, 
as is the case for business groups in Japan. Finally, the group firms analyzed in this 
study are representative of all types of business groups rather than being restricted to a 
few large groups like Big-6 Keiretsus in Japan and Top-30 Chaebols in Korea. All 
these characteristics of Indian business group firms and the availability of a relatively 
large sample of both group and non-group firms enable us to undertake a more 
appropriate analysis of investment – cash flow sensitivity and financing constraints. 
 
In addition to the analysis of business group firms, our study contributes to the 
literature by making a thorough investigation of the interactions between numerous 
firm characteristics and group-affiliation. Prior studies have used different firm 
characteristics in categorizing firms’ degree of financial constraints. However, the 
impact of these characteristics on the investment – cash flow sensitivity of group-
affiliated firms remains largely unexplored. Moreover, an in-depth investigation of the 
role of ownership structure in business groups has not been previously undertaken. 
Therefore, we examine the role played by size, age, leverage and ownership in 
influencing the investment – cash flow sensitivity group-affiliated firms. We conduct 
all these analyses using robust econometric approaches: estimating by means of 
ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares techniques both the Q and the Euler 
equation models of investments. 
 
The results of this study can be summarized as follows. We find a strong 





However, we do not observe any significant difference in the sensitivity between 
these two categories of firms. The result is robust to different regression specifications 
and estimation techniques. If investment – cash flow sensitivity were a good indicator 
of a firm’s financing constraint, then group-affiliated firms should have exhibited 
significantly lower sensitivity. But, there is no such evidence from Indian group-
affiliated firms. To the extent that Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Shin 
and Park (1999) report a significantly lower or no sensitivity for Japanese and Korean 
business groups, our findings provide new evidence.3 
 
One can argue that the differences in various firm-specific characteristics can 
significantly influence our findings. Therefore, we undertake a detailed examination 
of these features. A priori belief based on the traditional literature suggests that firms 
that are both large and affiliated to a business group should be least financially 
constrained, and should depict a lower investment – cash flow sensitivity. Our 
analysis shows no support for this argument. We observe that investments are more 
sensitive to cash flows for larger group-affiliated firms while the opposite is true for 
larger independent firms. Younger firms are characterized by greater information 
asymmetry and financial constraints relative to older firms. If investment – cash flow 
sensitivity were a useful measure of financing constraints, then younger firms should 
have exhibited significantly higher sensitivity. But, no such relationship is observed. 
As for the influence of leverage, the traditional literature predicts that firms that are 
independent and highly levered should face relatively higher financing constraints, 
and therefore, a higher investment - cash flow sensitivity compared to group-affiliated 







Finally, we examine the impact of ownership structure on the investment – 
cash flow relationship. Firms with large block holdings facilitate a greater alignment 
of inside and outside shareholder interests that leads to a reduction in information 
asymmetry and managerial discretion. This should result in a lower investment – cash 
flow sensitivity. Our results indicate that larger ownership holdings - corporate, 
institutional or insider - do not reduce the investment – cash flow sensitivity of group-
affiliated firms. For independent firms, institutional and insider shareholdings have no 
impact, whereas higher corporate ownership is associated with even a higher 
investment – cash flow sensitivity. These findings are once again contrary to 
expectation based on the traditional perspective.  If investment – cash flow sensitivity 
were a good indicator of financial constraints, all these analyses should not have 
yielded such contradictory results. Overall, the evidence presented in this study casts 
serious doubt on the reliability of using investment – cash flow sensitivity as a good 
measure of financing constraints of firms. 
 
The rest of the article is organized in the following manner. The literature on 
the investment - cash flow relationship with a special emphasis on business groups is 
briefly discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 we present the methodology used in 
examining the relationship. A description of the data used in this study is presented in 
Section 4. The empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 5. Some 








The phenomenon of business groups provides an interesting and unique 
ground to analyze the investment – cash flow relationship of firms. Business groups 
are usually a collection of many independent firms bound together with common ties 
and formal and informal relationships. Although a business group functions as a 
single and informal organization, each of the firms under its control is a separate legal 
entity. Most of these firms have well-defined production facilities and are listed on a 
stock exchange. 
 
Firms affiliated with business groups possess several advantages vis à vis 
independent firms. Investments of group firms can take place without severe financial 
constraints because business groups enable the formation of an internal capital market 
that supplements the capital-allocation function of the external capital market. Group-
affiliated firms are also expected to cope better with asymmetric information and 
contract enforcement problems present in the external capital market. The wedge 
between internal and external costs of funds is reduced as a result of business group 
formation. The fact that individual firms may also rely on the aggregate financial 
resources of the whole group is likely to improve their access to external funds. Taken 
together, all these advantages of being affiliated to a business group result in a less 
financing constraint for group-affiliated firms compared to independent firms.4 
 
A large body of literature investigates the investment – cash flow relationship 
using data from different countries. Many of these focus on developed economies (for 





Degryse and de Jong, 2005), while some others relate to emerging economies 
(Laeven, 2003). All these studies provide evidence of a firm’s investments being 
highly related to its cash flows. A few papers also analyze the investment – cash flow 
relationship for business groups, but obtain dissimilar findings. Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein (1991) find that Japanese companies that are affiliated with Keiretsu and 
have a close link with a main bank exhibit lower investment – cash flow sensitivity.  
However, Shin and Park (1999) observe no relationship between cash flow and 
investment for Korean Chaebol firms. Both studies document a significant positive 
relationship for non-group companies, and therefore, infer that unaffiliated firms face 
higher financial constraints in their investment decisions. Deloof (1998) and Perotti 
and Gelfer (2001) analyze the presence of business groups in two European countries: 
Belgium and Russia, respectively. Although Deloof (1998) uses a small sample of 
private firms in Belgium and faces problems in clearly distinguishing independent 
firms, he finds that investments of group-affiliated firms are not related to their cash 
flows. On the other hand, Perotti and Gelfer (2001) analyze single year data from a 
small sample of Russian firms and observe cash flows to be a significant determinant 
of investment for both industrial group firms and independent firms. Overall, these 
studies do not provide a clear-cut picture on the relationship between investment – 
cash flow sensitivity and financing constraints of business group firms. 
 
Almost all studies mentioned above accept the stance put forward by Fazzari 
et al. (1988) to use investment – cash flow sensitivity in gauging a firm’s financial 
constraint status. These studies claim that firms with more constraints exhibit a larger-
than-average investment – cash flow sensitivity. However, several recent studies 





constrained firms also exhibit a significantly higher sensitivity than firms that are 
more constrained. Cleary (1999) also observes that investments of firms with high 
creditworthiness are significantly more sensitive to internal funds than firms that are 
less creditworthy. Kadapakkam et al. (1998) analyze six OECD countries and 
document that smaller firms that are expected to have more financing constraints 
show lesser investment – cash flow sensitivity compared to larger firms. Finally, 
Allayanis and Mozumdar (2004) document that investment – cash flow sensitivity of 
firms with severe financial constraints is not different from firms having less financial 
constraints. 
 
Several recent studies also question the relevance of investment – cash flow 
sensitivity as an indicator of financial constraints. Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003) 
argue that firms facing financing constraints need not exhibit significant investment – 
cash flow sensitivities. Erickson and Whited (2000) use an advanced estimation 
technique like measurement error consistent generalized method of moments and find 
that the significant cash flow coefficients reported by earlier studies need not 
represent evidence of financing constraints. As a consequence of these criticisms, 
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) propose to use a new measure like the cash 
- cash flow sensitivity rather than the investment – cash flow sensitivity to test the 




The most popular approaches to test the investment – cash flow relationship 





equation model. Since each of these models has its own strengths and weaknesses and 
is widely employed in previous studies, we use both models to estimate the empirical 
results and to ensure that our results are not due to estimation bias. According to the Q 
model, a firm’s investments are mainly determined by expectations of future profit 
opportunities, usually estimated by the ratio of the market value of assets to its 
replacement value. The model adjusted to include the availability of internal funds as 


















21 ,                (1) 
 
where I denotes the investment in fixed assets; K denotes the capital stock at 
the beginning of the period; Q is the ratio of the market value of capital to its 
replacement value; CF stands for the cash flows; i  and t  denote the firm and time 
period, respectively; and ε  is the error term.5  
 
There are studies that divide the sample of firms based on a firm characteristic 
and then examine if the cash flow coefficient is different across the groups of firms. 
An equivalent and more direct approach is to estimate the model for the entire sample 
and interact the cash flow variable with a dummy variable representing the same 
characteristic. This direct approach is used throughout the study.6 The specific 
regression specification we use in the empirical analysis is the following: 
 
 




































In this equation, β1 is expected to be positive, because an increase in firm’s 
future profitability should lead to an increase in firm’s investment. If higher cash 
flows are a significant determinant of higher investments, then the coefficient β2 
should be positive. With Group as a dummy variable equal to 1 for group-affiliated 
firms, the traditional view is that the investment – cash flow sensitivity is expected to 
be smaller for less financially constrained firms. Therefore, the regression coefficient 
β3 capturing the influence of group-affiliation on the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow should be negative. In equation (2), we also add a few control variables (e.g. 
size, age, industry) denoted by Xit. 
 
The Q model has the advantage that it uses information from the capital 
market thus allowing direct measurement of expected value of future profitability. 
The results of the Q model are also more informative. On the other hand, stock market 
prices can be inefficient, the replacement value of all assets can be difficult to 
measure, and the commonly used average Q can be an imprecise proxy for the value 
of an additional unit of new capital (marginal Q). The main alternative to the Q model 
is the Euler equation investment model. The model exploits the relationship between 
investments in successive time periods and has the advantage that it does not require 
explicit use of future values. According to the Euler equation model, a firm’s current 
investments are determined by its total sales, cash flows, past investments and total 
debt. The model yields the following empirical specification:7 
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where S and D represent total sales and total debt, respectively, and all other 
variables are as defined earlier. The explicit regression specification we estimate to 
test the differential effect of business group firms is the following: 
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In this equation, the coefficient β2 reflects the investment – cash flow 
relationship and is expected to be positive. According to the traditional view, the less 
financially constrained group-affiliated firms are expected to show a lower investment 
– cash flow sensitivity relative to independent firms. In that case, the regression 
coefficient β3 should be negative. 
 
Both Q and Euler equation models are estimated using the ordinary least 
squares method. Since we wanted to ensure that our results are free from any 
estimation-bias, we also use two-stage least squares estimation procedure. Similar to 




The data come from the database called “Capitaline 2000” which contains 
balance sheet, income statement and ownership information for a large number of 
Indian firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. The sample period covers the 





available for all six years. Similar to Cleary (1999), we eliminate firms undergoing 
restructuring and/or bankruptcy by including firms with positive values of total assets 
and total sales. Our sample consists of a balanced panel of 339 firms. The sample 
firms are distributed across several industries, the most important of which are 
chemicals, construction, metal, transport, and trade and services. 
 
The database clearly identifies firms affiliated to a business group. The 
identification of business groups in India is relatively easy because firms are usually 
members of only one group. All firms in our sample have been affiliated with a group 
for many years. There is no evidence of any change in group-membership over time. 
Whether a firm is affiliated to a group or not is determined using a variety of sources 
like public announcements made by individual corporations and groups, and 
regulatory filings.8 Our sample comprises of 141 (42%) non-group firms and 198 
(58%) group firms (a total of 2034 firm-year observations). 
 
We collect data on various firm-specific variables. The precise definition of all 
variables is presented in the appendix. In order to eliminate the influence of extreme 
observations, we winsorize the data following the procedure adopted by Cleary 
(1999). The following rules are applied: (i) assign a value of 5 (-5) if cash flow/capital 
ratio is greater (lower) than 5 (-5); (ii) assign a value of 2 if investment/capital ratio is 
greater than 2; (iii) assign a value of 10 if Q is greater than 10; (iv) assign a value of 5 
if debt/capital ratio is greater than 5; (v) assign a value of 15 if sales/capital ratio is 






We also collect data on the ownership structure of firms. Three different 
ownership variables are analyzed: the percentage of shares held by insiders (directors 
and family members), financial institutions and non-financial corporations. The 
ownership data are available for one year and are assumed to remain same for the 
sample period. In the light of sporadic large-scale ownership transfers in India, any 
potential error in our results will be negligible. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
The descriptive statistics of different variables are presented in Table 1. Since 
we want to contrast the investment – cash flow relationship of group and non-group 
firms, we divide the full sample according to group affiliation. The table presents 
mean, median and standard deviations of each variable for both categories of firms. 
Several interesting results emerge. 
 
Looking first at the investment (I/K) and cash flow (CF/K) variables, we find 
that there are almost no remarkable differences between group and non-group firms. 
The mean investment-to-capital ratio is about 18% for both group and non-group 
firms, whereas the median values are 11.4% and 9.5%, respectively. The mean and 
median cash flow-to-capital ratios of group-affiliated firms are 36.8% and 27.3%, 
respectively. They are insignificantly different from those of stand-alone firms, which 
are 40.9% and 29.5%, respectively. 
  
We find that the mean and median Q ratios of group firms are larger than 





are 1.06 (0.78) and 0.82 (0.73), respectively. Focusing on the size of firms, we 
observe that group firms are much larger than non-group firms. The mean (median) 
total assets (TA) of group firms is 752 (173) millions Rupees compared to 134 (43) 
millions of non-group firms. The larger size of group firms is also observed when we 
look at the total sales (TS) figures. The differences in mean and median sales of group 
and non-group firms are statistically significant. The mean leverage (D/K) of group-
affiliated firms is significantly lower than that of independent firms, whereas the 
median values are not different. Group-affiliated firms are, on average, older than 
independent firms. The mean age of group-firms is 31 years compared to 22 years of 
non-group firms.  
 
Finally, Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on equity ownership of firms. 
We find that there are statistically significant differences in the ownership structure 
between group and non-group firms. The mean percentage of shares held by other 
companies in group-affiliated firms is 38% which is larger than that of stand-alone 
firms (24%). Similarly, the mean percentage of shares held by financial institutions in 
affiliated firms is 12% which is larger than that of independent firms (6%). On the 
other hand, the average insider ownership stake is higher in non-group firms (24% for 
stand-alone companies versus 7% for group affiliates). 
 
The investment – cash flow relationship of group and non-group firms is 
estimated using several alternative model specifications. Table 2 displays the 
regression results estimated from several specifications of the Q model in equation 
(2). Panel A reports the results of all model specifications using the ordinary least 





specifications using the two-stage least squares method (2SLS). All models use log of 
size and log of age as control variables. We also present results with and without time 
and industry dummies. In order to test whether the phenomenon of group-affiliation 
affects investments – cash flow relationship, we interact the cash flow variable with a 
group affiliation dummy variable. 
 
Panel A results indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between investment and Q. All model specifications show almost the 
same magnitude of the estimated coefficient. The explanatory power of regressions is 
not low (varying from 13% to 17%) and consistent with prior studies. Turning to the 
cash flow variable, we observe that the estimated coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant in each model specification. It indicates that cash flows are 
strongly related to investments for all firms. We also observe that the estimated cash 
flow coefficient is not significantly different between group-affiliated and 
independent firms. The interaction coefficients of cash flow and group dummy 
variable in models (2) and (4) are statistically insignificant.9 
 
Besides the OLS technique, we estimate the same specifications using the 
2SLS technique. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 2. As before, the 
coefficients of Q and cash flow are found to be positive and statistically significant. 
We observe that the coefficients of the cash flow term interacting with business group 
dummy in models (6) and (8) are positive and statistically significant. This is opposite 
of that attributed to it by the traditionalists. If investment – cash flow sensitivity were 
a good measure of financing constraints, then group-affiliated firms should have 





We also assess the robustness of our results by estimating the Euler model of 
investment. The results are presented in Table 3. Once again, the cash-flow 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant, but the group interaction terms 
are statistically insignificant. This is inconsistent with the claim that firms belonging 
to business groups should depict a lower investment – cash flow relationship because 
these firms experience lower financing constraints relative to independent firms.  
 
We make further sensitivity checks of our results. One can argue that the 
observed strong investment – cash flow sensitivity of group-affiliated firms can be 
attributed to overinvestments made by group firms with poor growth prospects (Hoshi 
et al., 1991). To examine this, we follow prior studies in using Q as a proxy for a 
firm’s growth prospects and split the group-affiliated sample into high Q and low Q 
firms based on the median value. For overinvestment to be a reason behind higher 
sensitivity of group-affiliated firms, one expects cash flows of group-firms with 
meager growth prospects (low Q) should be more sensitive to their investments than 
the cash flows of group-firms with huge growth prospects (high Q). The results of the 
analysis are presented in Table 4.10 The OLS results indicate that the investment - 
cash flow sensitivity of group-affiliated firms with poor growth prospects are 
statistically indistinguishable from that of firms with high growth prospects. The 
2SLS results indicate even significantly higher cash flow sensitivity for group-
affiliated high Q firms. This is contrary to the expectation if overinvestments were 
driving our results.11 
 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) argue that the inclusion of negative cash 





significantly influence investment - cash flow sensitivities. Cash flows of firms with 
weaker financial positions can be less sensitive to investment. In order to examine the 
possibility that this phenomenon could influence our findings, we re-estimate the 
results using various OLS and 2SLS regression specifications after eliminating all 
negative cash flow observations (which constitute 6.7% of the sample). These results 
show similar sensitivities among group-affiliated and independent firms, and hence, 
are not reported. 
 
The use of different specifications and methodologies yield very similar 
results. We find no support for the claim that the investment – cash flow sensitivity 
for group-affiliated firms is lower than for unaffiliated firms. Since group firms are 
widely believed to have relatively easier access to more financial resources than non-
group firms, an implication of our result is that the investment – cash flow sensitivity 
cannot be used as a reliable measure for firm’s financing constraints. 
 
The influence of firm characteristics 
 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 show that there are significant 
differences in firm characteristics such as size, age, leverage and ownership structure 
between group-affiliated and stand-alone firms. This leads to the question whether our 
finding of no difference in investment – cash flow relationship is affected by these 
characteristics as well. Therefore, to investigate further whether the investments of 
group-affiliated firms respond differently to cash flows than the investments of stand-









The size of a firm may influence the investment – cash flow relationship. 
Larger firms are in general believed to face less capital market imperfections because 
lenders of funds have lower screening and monitoring costs. These firms are therefore 
expected to exhibit lower investment – cash flow sensitivity. In Table 5, we present 
the results when the total sample is divided according to firm size. Since group-
affiliated firms are, on average, several times larger than independent firms, it is 
important for the empirical analysis to appropriately control for it. We classify group 
and non-group firms as large when their total assets are greater their corresponding 
median values. We distinguish the investment – cash flow sensitivity between 
affiliated and independent firms by adding an interactive group dummy variable.  Our 
results show that in the large firm sub-sample, the coefficient of cash flow and group 
dummy interaction is positive (0.097) and statistically significant (t = 2.378). It 
indicates that the investment – cash flow sensitivity for large group-affiliated firms is 
significantly higher than that for large non-group firms. If investment – cash flow 
sensitivity were a good measure of financing constraints, then this finding is contrary 
to the expectation. This is because both large and group-affiliated firms are deemed a 
priori to have less financing constraints, and therefore, should exhibit the least 
investment – cash flow sensitivity. 
 
We also analyze where the total sample is divided into group-affiliated firms 
and stand-alone firms, and the coefficient of the cash flow term is interacted with a 





group (non-group) firm is higher than the median, and zero otherwise. These results 
are presented in the last two columns of Table 5. We find that the investment  - cash 
flow sensitivity for large group-affiliated firms is positive (0.098) and statistically 
significant (t = 1.735). It indicates that investment is more sensitive to cash flows of 
larger group companies and less sensitive for smaller group companies. This 
contradiction is, once again, supportive of the claim that the investment – cash flow 




 Next, we test whether the differences in age affect the investment – cash flow 
sensitivity of group and non-group firms. The age of firms may play a role on the 
severity of financial constraints. It is generally believed that older firms face relatively 
less constraints than younger firms because these have better credit records and better 
information availability. On the other hand, younger firms are riskier, more opaque 
and less likely to obtain external financing. The empirical results are presented in 
Table 6. The sample is split into group and non-group firms. In each regression, in 
addition to the earlier used explanatory variables, we interact cash flow variable with 
a dummy that identifies older or younger firms. As before, our results show that the 
cash flow variable has a positive and significant relationship with investments for 
both group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms. But, we find that age does not influence 
this relationship among group and non-group firms. The interaction coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. It indicates that neither young nor old firms exhibit a 








The amount of leverage can also produce a differential impact. Companies 
with relatively high leverage are expected to face more difficulty in obtaining 
additional external funds from the capital market, and therefore, are more financially 
constrained than firms with low leverage. The results presented in Table 6 show that 
for group-affiliated firms, the investment – cash flow sensitivity is not different for 
high leveraged firms in comparison to low leveraged firms. Similarly, the leverage 
interaction variable is statistically insignificant for independent firms. If firms with 
high leverage are expected to face more difficulty in obtaining additional funds, then 
the traditionalist expects, at least in case of independent firms, a high investment – 
cash flow sensitivity. Our finding of no such difference is remarkable because 
independent firms do not have access to internal capital market, a feature group-
affiliated firms do possess. This result further questions the validity of using 




Ownership structure can affect investment – cash flow sensitivity through 
shareholders’ monitoring qualities and the possibility of investing additional resources 
into the firm. Active monitoring by large shareholders is expected to reduce 
managerial discretion and information asymmetry thereby lowering firm’s investment 
– cash flow sensitivity. At the same time, large shareholders can help in reducing 
financing constraints. Since these features can vary according to different types of 





samples: corporate ownership, institutional ownership and insider ownership. As 
before, the regression estimations are done for group and non-group firms separately, 
and an interaction term is used to reflect the ownership of a specific category of 
shareholders. The results are presented in Table 7. 
 
In line with our earlier results, we continue to observe that the investment – 
cash flow sensitivity is positive and statistically significant for both group and non-
group firms. But, there is a differential impact of corporate ownership. Corporate 
ownership does not affect the investment – cash flow sensitivity among group-
affiliated firms. On the other hand, it has a significant positive impact among 
independent firms. The interaction coefficient for corporate ownership dummy is 
positive (0.112) and statistically significant (t = 2.374). Thus, for unaffiliated firms 
with high corporate ownership, the cash flow sensitivity is significantly larger than for 
those with low corporate ownership. If investment – cash flow sensitivity were a good 
measure of financing constraints, then these firms with higher corporate ownership 
should have depicted significantly lower sensitivity. Our results fail to offer any 
support for this prediction. 
 
With regard to institutional ownership, we find that it does not significantly 
influence the investment - cash flow sensitivity of group-affiliated as well as 
unaffiliated firms. The presence of large institutional shareholders is expected to 
reduce managerial discretion of overinvestments while making it easier for firms to 
have more funds available. Had investment – cash flow sensitivity been a valid 
measure of financial constraints, then firms with larger institutional ownerships would 





presented in Table 7 indicate no significant difference in the influence of insider 
ownership in the investment – cash flow sensitivity among group-affiliated and 
independent firms. These results are again not in line with the traditional expectation 
of a lower investment – cash flow sensitivity for firms with higher levels of insider 
shareholdings. 
  
6. Summary and Conclusions  
 
This study examines the reliability of using the investment – cash flow 
sensitivity as a good measure of financing constraints by comparing business group 
firms with independent firms. It focuses on Indian business groups because these are 
characterized by some important features like accurate identification of group 
affiliation, absence of in-house banks, and stability of affiliation to one specific 
business group allowing us to perform a reliable empirical analysis. Two different 
frameworks are widely used to test the investment – cash flow relationship: the Q 
model and the Euler equation model. Since each of these models has different 
strengths and weaknesses, we use both to estimate the empirical results. We also 
perform robustness checks using both OLS and 2SLS estimation techniques. We 
estimate the results using a panel data set of 339 firms of the period 1995 – 2000.  
 
Our results show that there is a positive and statistically significant investment 
– cash flow sensitivity for all firms, but no significant difference in the sensitivity 
between group-affiliates and independent firms. A few authors like Hoshi et al. (1991) 
and Shin and Park (1999) argue that group membership helps in relieving financial 





the other hand, independent firms are relatively more financially constrained, and 
thus, expected to have larger cash flow sensitivity. The results of our study lend no 
support to the findings of these studies. 
 
 In order to probe these findings further and to check the robustness of our 
results, we examine the impact of several firm specific characteristics such as size, 
age, leverage and ownership by forming sub-samples and using interactive dummies. 
According to the traditional literature, larger group firms are in general expected to 
show the least investment – cash flow sensitivity. These firms face less capital market 
imperfections as lenders of funds have lower screening and monitoring costs. In 
addition, these firms are able to reap the benefits of an internal capital market. Our 
results indicate that the investment – cash flow sensitivity is high for large business 
group firms whereas it is low for large non-group firms. The finding is inconsistent 
with investment – cash flow sensitivity being a reliable measure of financing 
constraints. 
 
We find that age does not influence the relationship among both group and 
non-group firms: young and old firms exhibit no difference in their investment – cash 
flow sensitivity. This result is also surprising and contrary to the traditional 
expectation as older firms arguably have better credit records and are characterized by 
lower information asymmetry problems that reduce the wedge between internal and 
external funds and should result in lower investment - cash flow sensitivity. 
 
Another notable finding is that leverage has no significant differential impact: 





levered firms is not different from that of low-levered firms. If investment – cash flow 
sensitivity were a good indicator of financial constraints, then one should have at least 
observed a significantly higher sensitivity among highly levered independent firms 
which should be more handicapped in their ability to obtain funds than corresponding 
group-affiliated firms. Apart from the enhanced costs and difficulties in obtaining 
resources from the external market, these firms do not have access to an internal 
capital market to alleviate their liquidity constraints. 
 
Finally, we examine if the investment – cash flow sensitivity is influenced by 
corporate governance characteristic like ownership structure. We observe that 
differences in corporate ownership do not affect the investment – cash flow sensitivity 
of group-affiliated firms. On the other hand, large corporate ownership is associated 
with a significantly higher sensitivity among independent firms. This is contrary to 
the traditional expectation, as high corporate ownership which is assumed to be 
associated with greater alignment of inside and outside shareholder interests and 
lower agency costs should have yielded a reduction in investment – cash flow 
sensitivity. 
 
The impact of institutional shareholdings is insignificant and not in line with 
expectation. One would anticipate a reduction in investment - cash flow sensitivity 
among firms with high institutional ownership. This is because these shareholders 
have dual debt and equity holdings and are expected to face lower moral hazard 
problems thereby leading to lower financial constraints of firms. As for the insider 
ownership, it is expected that high insider holdings should result in greater alignment 





cash flow sensitivity. However, for both group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms, we 
find insignificant results. These results once again demonstrate the inability of 
investment – cash flow sensitivity to be a good indicator of a firm’s financial 
constraints.  
 
Cumulatively, the results of this study show that investment of firms that are a 
priori expected to be more financially constrained are not necessarily more sensitive 
to their cash flows. The use of investment functions using alternative models based on 
the Q ratio and the Euler equation, and alternative estimation techniques like OLS and 
2SLS yields consistent results, and thereby strengthens the paper’s conclusions. Our 
results lend strong empirical support for the doubts raised by earlier studies in 












I    Investment in fixed assets (= purchase of fixed assets) 
 
K    Book value of fixed assets  
 
CF Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization 
 
Q  (Market value of equity + Book value of total debt) / 
Book value of total assets  
 
TA    Book value of total assets 
 
TS    Total sales 
 
D    Book value of total debt 
 
AGE    Number of years since incorporation 
 
COR    Percentage of shares held by non-financial corporations 
 
FIN    Percentage of shares held by financial institutions 
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1 For a survey, see Hubbard (1998) and Lensink, Bo and Sterken (2001). 
2 Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) discuss the problems one faces in accurately 
determining group membership of Japanese firms. 
3 It is important to note here that our result of less constrained firms not exhibiting 
lower investment – cash flow sensitivity is not a characteristic of Indian business 
groups alone. Analyzing recent data of US firms, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) 
do not observe any significant difference in the investment - cash flow sensitivity 
between constrained and unconstrained firms. 
4 Under certain circumstances, group-affiliated firms may also face some financing 
constraints. A financial intermediary, if present, can use its relationship to exploit the 
firm for its own advantage thereby increasing the cost of external finance. The 
controlling owners may engage in activities to redirect funds for their own benefits 
and to invest in other affiliated firms. The magnitude of such constraint, however, is 
not expected to outweigh many other benefits of group-affiliation. 
5 For the derivation of the Q model, see Hubbard (1998). 
6 We did examine the specifications using group and non-group samples separately 
and found similar results. 
7 For the derivation of the Euler equation, see Bond and Meghir (1994). 
8 A random check of group-affiliation of many firms conducted by us reveals that the 
classification of the database is accurate. 
9 Our findings are similar to those obtained by Khanna and Palepu (2000). The main 
focus of their study was to examine the relative profitability of Indian business 
groups. They just mention finding a strong investment – cash flow sensitivity for both 
group and non-group firms, but do not provide any numerical result. 
10 For comparison purpose, we present the results of non-group firms as well. 
11 The results are qualitatively similar when we use Q >1 as the partitioning criteria. 
12  As before, we have performed estimations using the 2SLS technique and also the 
Euler equation. These estimations yielded similar results and, for that reason, we have 






Table 1. Summary statistics comparing group and non-group firms 
The table presents summary statistics of variables calculated over the fiscal years ending 1997-2000. 
The sample contains 198 group firms (792 firm-year observations) and 141 non-group firms (564 firm-
year observations). Investment (I), capital stock (K), cash flow (CF), total assets (TA), total sales (TS), 
total debt (D) are expressed in million Indian Rupees. Q is the ratio of market to book value of total 
assets. AGE is expressed in years since incorporation. Insider (INS) is the percentage of shares held by 
directors and family. Financial (FIN) is the percentage of shares held by domestic financial institutions. 
Corporation (COR) is the percentage of shares held by domestic non-financial corporations. All 
variables are defined in the appendix. The asterisks * and ** denote statistical significance of the 
difference between group and non-group firms at 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 
Group Non-Group  
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
I/K 0.184 0.114** 0.221 0.179 0.095 0.247 
CF/K 0.368 0.273 0.461 0.409 0.295 0.595 
Q 1.057** 0.780** 1.042 0.819 0.734 0.539 
TA 752** 173** 2100 134 43 612 
TS 574** 192** 1283 158 57 628 
TS/K 2.761** 2.000** 2.567 3.471 2.291 3.344 
D/K 0.978* 0.840 0.679 1.054 0.821 0.885 
AGE 31* 24 21.343 22 16 16.228 
COR 0.378** 0.387** 0.186 0.240 0.195 0.194 
FIN 0.117** 0.086** 0.107 0.061 0.023 0.086 








Table 2. Regression results for the Q Model 
 
Panel A. OLS estimation 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is the ordinary least squares 
(OLS). The dependent variable is the investment-to-capital ratio. Q is the ratio of the market value of 
total assets to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. Group Dummy is 
an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to a business group, and zero otherwise. Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. The 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. The 
total number of firm-year observations is 1356. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is 
indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
























































Time and Industry 
dummies 
No No Yes Yes 








Panel B. 2SLS estimation 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is two-stage least squares 
estimation (2SLS ). The dependent variable is the investment-to-capital ratio of a firm. The variable Q 
is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-
to-capital ratio. Group Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to a 
business group, and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural 
logarithm of years since incorporation. All regressions use previous year’s variables as instruments. 
The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. 
The total number of firm-year observations is 1356. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is 
indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
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Table 3. Regression results for the Euler equation 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation methods are the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and the two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS). The dependent variable is the investment-to-
capital ratio of a firm. The variable sales (-1) is the one-period lagged sales-to-capital ratio. Cash flow 
(-1) is the one period lagged cash flow-to-capital ratio. Group Dummy is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if a firm belongs to a business group, and zero otherwise. Investment (-1) is one-period 
lagged investment-to-capital ratio. Investment (-1) sq is the squared value one-period lagged 
investment. Leverage (-1) sq is the squared value of total debt divided by total assets lagged by one-
period. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since 
incorporation. The 2SLS estimation uses previous year’s values as instruments. The heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. The total number of firm-
year observations is 1356. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated in bold face 
and by * and **, respectively. 
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Table 4. Regression results examining overinvestment 
 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and the two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS). The dependent variable is the investment-to-
capital ratio. The variable Q is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. High Q is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the 
group or non-group firm’s Q is greater than or equal to the corresponding medians, and zero otherwise. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. 
The 2SLS estimations use previous year’s variables as instruments. The heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 
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Time and Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes           Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.14 























Table 5. Regression results for the size sub-samples 
 
The table presents the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) results. The dependent variable is the 
investment-to-capital ratio of a firm. The size sub-samples are formed by using the median values of 
group and non-group firms. Large firms are those with total assets greater than or equal to sample 
median whereas small firms are those with total assets lower than sample median. Group Dummy is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to a business group, and zero otherwise. Size 
Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the size of group or non-group firm is larger than 
or equal to respective median values, and zero otherwise. The variable Q is the ratio of the market 
value of total assets to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. The 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
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Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.19 
No. of 
observations 








Table 6. Regression results for the age and leverage sub-samples 
 
The table presents the ordinary least squares regression results (OLS). The dependent variable is the 
investment-to-capital ratio of a firm. The age and leverage sub-samples are formed by segregating 
these into group and non-group firms. The variable Q is the ratio of the market value of total assets to 
book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. Age Dummy and Leverage 
Dummy are indicator variables that are equal to one if the corresponding values are greater than or 
equal to the group and non-group medians, and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. The heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 
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Time and Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.15 0.23 0.16 




         
  
 





Table 7. Regression results for the ownership sub-samples 
 
The table presents the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) results. The dependent variable is the investment-to-capital ratio of a firm. The ownership sub-samples are 
formed by segregating these into group and non-group firms. The variable Q is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash 
flow-to-capital ratio. Ownership Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the corresponding ownership values are greater than or equal to the group or non-group 
sample median, and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. The heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated in bold face and by * and **, 
respectively. 
 
Corporate ownership Institutional ownership Insider ownership  



























































































Time and Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.15 
No. of observations 792 564 792 564 792 564 
 
